Friday, December 7, 2012

NOTES FROM A NATIVE SON


The Rise of the Sharing Communities

Creative Commons photo by Lobkovs
As the sharing economy picks up momentum, its reach has become global. In cities and towns around the world, people are creating ways to share everything from baby clothes to boats, hardware to vacation homes. There are also groups emerging that consciously identify with the big-picture sharing movement. These groups focus on education, action and community-building, and advocate for a cultural shift toward widespread sharing.
From neighborhood-level cooperatives to global organizations, these groups work to bring sharing into the mainstream. They see sharing as a new paradigm; a means to a more democratic society, and they understand that sharing is not a new fad but an ancient practice that technology is reinvigorating.
What follows is a far-from-exhaustive list of sharing advocacy groups around the world. There are, certainly, many others. Ideally, this list will serve as a springboard for connecting with a sharing community near you, or one that is aligned with your vision for a shareable world.
Ouishare
With hubs in Paris, London, Berlin, Barcelona, Rome and Brussels, Ouishare is an international network of entrepreneurs, citizens, activists, journalists and designers working toward the development of the collaborative economy.
“To me, the question is not so much about whether access is better than ownership,” says Ouishare co-founder Antonon Leonard. “It's about people. It's a change in culture. People have just started to realize that they have amazing opportunities to express themselves, be their own bosses, and start a new life.”
Leonard stresses that community “is everything” and that Ouishare is built around people who do things, not those who say they will do things.
“We need complex solutions to solve complex world issues,” he says. “We bet that it's only by connecting people with different perspectives that we'll be able to bring sustainable change. Sharing is an amazing opportunity to build a community and you need to build a community in order to make sharing work.”“We bet that it's only by connecting people with different perspectives that we'll be able to bring sustainable change.
Shared Squared
Based in New York, Shared Squared is helping people to share by holding events, providing resources to empower sharing economy innovators, and making it easier for people to get involved in the movement.
“Our approach is simply to give people the opportunity to learn about, know about, meet and support other people in the same industry,” says Shared Squared founder, Adam Berk. “If there is one industry that should collaborate, it's ours. So I want to make sure we all work together and support each other when possible and where it makes sense...I think we are unique in the fact that we are transparent, do not care about politics and have a no nonsense policy when it comes to competition: everyone in the space is welcome, no matter how big you are.”
Berk would like to see the sharing economy move away from telling people why they should share, and focus on making sharing cheaper, better, more convenient and more fun. He believes that in the future, third parties will play a bigger role in managing risk, inventory and maintenance for P2P companies.
“I do not think you need to be a Treehugger to share,” he says. “Rich people share yachts and planes. When you are not using your money, you put it in the bank. The sharing economy in general has done a bad job at marketing. Hotels are not the antithesis of Airbnb. Hotels are actually shared rooms too, just with a different model. The third party plays a bigger role in a transaction that is still P2P in reality.”
The People Who Share
The UK-based organization the People Who Share is working to bring sharing mainstream. Committed to “reshaping the world through sharing,” their vision is a thriving sharing economy where everyone is a supplier of tools, resources, goods, experiences, time and experience. Recently, along with partners Ouishare and Shareable, they organized the first ever Global Sharing Day.
“Fundamentally, we live on a planet with finite resources and we have a growing population, we are going to need to share to survive,” says Benita Matofska, Chief Sharer at the People Who Share. “The businesses and organisations of the future are those who build their models around the sharing of resources.”
“What differentiates the sharing economy from our current economic model,” Matofska says, “is that this new economy is built by, with and for people and planet. Fundamentally people unite around the idea that we have unlimited sharing potential and sharing is how we build strong, sustainable, happy connected communities.”
Unstash
Unstash is a peer-to-peer platform for collaborative consumption that works to facilitate and enhance the sharing experience by making sharing fun, easy and social. The Toronto-based organization is “laser focused on the essence of sharing,” says Unstash co-founder Lon Wong. “We're not about connecting strangers to make a few dollars, and we're not even about swapping which can become dependent on a coincidence of wants. We exist to facilitate and enhance the sharing experience for community good.”
For Wong, sharing isn't merely about saving money, or living simply, or the environment, it's about our shared humanity. “The sharing of things can seem trivial,” he says. “But in my experience, sharing something even small and tangible can become a gateway towards the sharing of life in deep and meaningful ways.”
Let’s Collaborate!
Let's Collaborate! is an event series developed to inspire and connect the collaborative consumption community in New York City.
“The purpose of Let’s Collaborate! is to gather entrepreneurs, academics, VCs, and people passionate about the sharing economy together over thought- provoking events,” says Melissa O’Young, founder of Let’s Collaborate!. “I believe that something magical happens when you put a group of passionate people in a room together. My goal,” she continues, “is to create a core community of sharing economy enthusiasts first, which will hopefully inspire them to infect the greater community towards more collaborative behaviors.”
P2P Foundation
The P2P Foundation is “an observatory of open, sharing, P2P and commons-oriented activities.” Playing host to numerous conferences and boasting 18,000 articles on the matter, the organization is a valuable hub of information for researchers and practitioners of the sharing economy.
“Different phenomena have led to a big underlying paradigm shift in favor of sharing,” says Michel Bauwens, one of the founders of the P2P Foundation. “Networked internets have dramatically decreased the coordination and transaction costs, making access to shared resources often cheaper than ownership of an individual resource. You keep all the advantages but at dramatically lower cost,” he continues. “This changes the perspective from individual scarcity-driven behaviour (I buy this because I may need it), to abundance-driven behaviour in which there is a confidence that access to a resource will be possible without owning it.”
KoKonsum
"The sharing economy is going to be a major driver for a new kind of economy we are heading towards.”Based in Germany, KoKonsum is an open network for people interested in the sharing economy. The organization seeks to give visibility to existing, as well as new, sharing economy startups, and initiatives that everybody can be part of.
“In my opinion, the sharing economy is going to be a major driver for a new kind of economy we are heading towards,” says Daniel Bartel, founder of KoKonsum. “Collaborative Consumption will disrupt many industries, help tackle environmental problems, empower people to fulfill their dreams and build a new sense of trust.”
He emphasizes the importance of trust and reputation in moving the sharing economy forward saying, “Only in trusted peer networks is it possible to carefully share ones things with others. This doesn’t mean that you need to know everyone personally, but it is important that you have a reputation of being trustworthy.”
Consumo Colaborativo
Consumo Colaborativo is a digital media platform to spread information and best practices to the sharing community. Based in Spain, the organization acts as a connecting point for various people and projects and an information hub for sharing enthusiasts.
“The sharing economy is about understanding consumption and ownership are means to an end but not the final end/objective itself,” says Consumo Colaborativo founder Albert Canigueral. “We have lived in an extremely inefficient way for the last decades and collaborative consumption allows to make a more rational use of all the stuff already built and the new stuff that humans will keep creating.”
Share Tompkins
Based in Ithaca, New York, Share Tompkins steers people to resources that already exist, such as food pantries and freeskool, as well as sharing platforms that are emerging locally, such as the Ithaca Carshare and the Ithaca Biodiesel Cooperative. It also helps to organize and spread the word about skillshares, swaps, barters and other sharing events.
“Sharing is not in any way a new idea,” says Share Tompkins co-founder Shira Evergreen, pointing out that Ithaca is home to Ithaca Hours, the oldest alternative local currency in the U.S. that is still operating. “What's exciting about this particular moment in time is the fusion of sharing with technology, design and entrepreneurship. It is as if we are collectively relearning how to rely on one another and to do so we need to harness the tools of our time. I believe that once sharing has become second nature again,” she continues, “we will be less reliant on particular sharing platforms and settle into a new/old modality where we see our local community as an interconnected web of resources that can meet everyone's needs.”
Collaborative Consumption
Working to promote access over ownership, and "unlock the idling capacity" of assets in ways that offer enormous social, economic and environmental potential, Collaborative Consumption is a global advocate for the sharing economy.
“The key benefit of the sharing economy that we are the most passionate about is that it empowers people,” says Rachel Botsman, founder and director of Collaborative Consumption and author of the book What’s Mine is Yours: How Collaborative Consumption is Changing the Way We Live. “It empowers people to live more sustainably, to build community in new ways, to make money from their existing assets and most importantly, to rediscover a human connection we have lost somewhere along the way.”
Botsman and her team focus on getting the business community on board with the sharing economy through speeches, interviews, articles, consultation and connecting diverse organizations.
“One of the beautiful things about the community around Collaborative Consumption is its diversity,” says Botsman. “You can be in a small town and have a local leader championing ideas, to a swanky VC office where the partners are telling you it’s the next big thing, to a government leader taking a proactive role in growing the sector. Connecting all these different groups, getting them to talk the same language and realize their objectives can be aligned is something our community is passionate about.”
LETSLinkUK
Local Exchange Trading Systems or Schemes (LETS) are community-based networks in the UK in which people trade goods or services. LETSLinkUK tests and develops models for exchange currencies, provides a central platform for existing LETS schemes and helps interested communities develop their own local exchange currency.
Sharetribe
A network of online communities that share goods, services, rides, spaces and more, the Finland-based Sharetribe facilitates sharing in a trusted environment. An open source platform, Sharetribe is made up of sharers, “tribes” of sharers, coders interested in developing on top of Sharetribe code and local ambassadors who translate and spread information about Sharetribe in their communities.
“We strongly believe that access will triumph over ownership in the long term,” says co-founder and CEO Juho Makkonen. “It was the way the world was organized before, and in many areas it will happen again. Building communities is at the very core of sharing, and also at the very core of Sharetribe,” he continues. “For most people, it's difficult to trust all the people in the world so communities help us create trust. Community is also a powerful motivator: people who identify themselves with a certain community usually want to contribute to it's common interests.”
Post-Growth Institute
“By sharing more, we open up the ability for an equitable economic model to fully emerge.”With a tagline, “From bigger, towards better,” the Post-Growth Institute provides platforms for people to offer insights about sharing in an economic context. Advocates for reduction in consumption and minimizing one’s ecological footprint, the Australian-based institute supports and promotes sharing communities and prominent sharing advocates, organizes community and networking events including Free Money Day, and provides numerous articles and resources.
“By sharing more, we open up the ability for an equitable economic model to fully emerge,” says Post-Growth Institute founder, Donnie Maclurcan. “Sharing reminds us that there is enough to go around in this world, and that we don't need unhealthy competition in order for that distribution to take place. By sharing,” he continues, “dysfunctional status envy and the notion that private ownership is the epitome of a 'civilised' society can be nullified in a supportive way.”
He notes that sharing is nothing new, but we now have the benefit of technology to assist us. “The modern return to shared access models,” he says, “has the ability to place old wisdoms about custodianship into a modern context that has the new benefit of powerful digital platforms to facilitate effective sharing.”
Sharers of San Francisco
Formed to connect people interested in the new, sharing economy, Sharers of San Francisco facilitates events, dinners and Meetups where participants can meet other sharing enthusiasts, learn from each other and make connections in the sharing movement.
“What's unique about the Sharers of San Francisco,” says Chelsea Rustrum, founder of the group and author of the forthcoming book, It’s a Shareable Life, “is that we get people together who enjoy sharing. These are the people that need to be talking: the P2P founders, Airbnb hosts, Couchsurfers, coworking mavens, car sharers and ride sharing advocates. We don't just get the peer-to-peer marketplace founders together for education chats,” she continues. “Instead, we invite users and founders to get together for largely unstructured events like Collaborative Happy Hours and Coworking Days...We get the right people talking and helping one another through conversations and potential collaborations.”
School of Commoning
The School of Commoning is a worldwide community of people participating in the local and global commons. It offers workshops, seminars and courses and has a thriving online presence to connect sharing advocates and facilitators.
“School of Commoning works to enhance individual and collective competences in the creation, protection, and governance of commons,” says George Por, co-founder of the school. “Commons are what we share in common not through ownership for private gain but through stewardship of resources needed for a good life. As we move towards a commons-based society,” he continues, “we see more and more examples of trust, reciprocity and relationships replacing the commodification of goods and services.”
He emphasizes that community-building is an essential element to creating a commons-based world.
“Building communities around sharing is a key building block of the world we want to live in,” he says. “It is the practical way to get there. Without such learning communities that don’t just talk about ideas but act as laboratories of learning and using new tools, we would just recreate the old structures that got us the mess in the first place.”
Las Indias
An Iberian Peninsula-based cooperative, Las Indias advocates for distributed, P2P practices as a revived economic model. The group behind the book The P2P Mode of Production: an Indiano Manifesto, Las Indias educates people about the benefits of the sharing economy, promotes the commons and connects participants in the sharing movement.
Collaborative Chats
A monthly series in San Francisco for the collaborative consumption movement, Collaborative Chats brings together leaders, participants and curious bystanders of the sharing economy for panel-style discussions. The chats, which Shareable is a founding partner of, range from topics of funding and gaining traction in the movement to exploring how and why Generation Y-ers are more interested in sharing than owning.
Share Exchange
One of the nation’s first local economy centers, the Share Exchange in Santa Rosa, Calif. is a community meeting place, a collaborative co-working space, a local made marketplace and a non-profit promoting local economies.
“Share Exchange is at the crossroads of the localization movement and the shift to sharing,” says co-founder Kelley Rajala. “We are a unique intersection of sharing, exchanging and local economic development.”
Rajala explains that we simply can’t continue to consume as we have been and that being in the most wealthy, powerful and resource-consuming nation, she feels a responsibility to facilitate the transition toward a sharing lifestyle.
“By having a physical shared location and organizing events, mixers and swaps, we have cued up the opportunity for people to meet new friends,” she says. “Sharing becomes a natural activity within a trusted circle of people.”
Mesh Labs
Built around the principles introduced by author/entrepreneur Lisa Gansky in her book The Mesh: Why the Future of Business is Sharing, Mesh Labs serves to help businesses succeed in the sharing economy. With a global reach and a reputation as leaders within the sharing movement, Gansky and her team utilize technology, social media and community connections to educate startup and existing companies about the wisdom of embracing “the new wave of information-enabled commerce that's also improving our communities and our planet.”
Shareable Australia
The recently-created Australian channel of Shareable Magazine, Shareable Australia acts to create person-to-person connections within the sharing movement. The channel helps to facilitate and spread the word about Meetups, unconferences, swap meets and the sharing marketplace, and reports on local movements and events.
“The sharing movement provides a compelling alternative vision for succeeding in the 21st century by placing commons-based models at the centre of our politics, economics and society,” says Shareable Australia editor Darren Sharp. “The central idea of the commons is that resources, both physical & knowledge-based, can be shared for mutual benefit that give people access to an ends (a ride to work, lemons or an encyclopedia) without needing to own the means to produce these assets.”
Sharp notes that sharing enables individuals to define themselves through relationships of trust, reputational standing and social connectedness rather than the commodity treadmill of mainstream consumer culture.
“Common sense tells us that relationships matter and provide the basis for happy, productive people and communities,” he says. “The sharing movement can help us get over our attachment to stuff and re-frame idle material possessions and surplus knowledge as an exciting opportunity to share, learn and connect with those around us.”
Pioneering Organizations
Many of the above-listed groups are new kids on the block in the world of sharing. There are several well-established, pioneering sharing organizations that have long been leading the way including North American Students of CooperationThe Center for Popular EconomicsThe New Economics Institute; and the New Economics Foundation.
Your Sharing Groups
As we journeyed down the rabbit hole of sharing groups, with each one leading to another, we became aware of just how many organizations are advocating for sharing. We want to know who is out there doing what, and to connect the groups with Shareable readers. In the comments, please let us know what sharing advocacy organizations exist in your community.

Saturday, November 3, 2012

NOTES FROM A NATIVE SON


In Sandy’s Wake, New York’s Landscape of Inequity Revealed

The shock of Sandy is still rippling across the northeastern United States. But in the microcosm of New York City, we can already see who’s going to bear the brunt of the damage. As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, floodwaters have a way of exposing the race and class divisions that stratify our cities.Flood damage to the subway system will disproportionately affect the lower-income New Yorkers who use it the most, worsening structural inequality. (MTA / Flickr / Creative Commons).
Though some bus and subway service is returning, many neighborhoods dependent on public transportation remain functionally shuttered. Not surprisingly, recent surveys show that Metropolitan Transit Authority ridership consists mostly of people of color, nearly half living on less than $50,000 a year in one of the world’s most expensive cities.
It’s true that Sandy’s path of destruction was to some extent an equal opportunity assault, pummeling the trendiest downtown enclaves and blighted neighborhoods alike. But residents' levels of resilience to the storm--the capacity to absorb trauma--will likely follow the sharp peaks and valleys of the city’s economic landscape.
Even before the storm, inequities arose in the city's disaster preparations. Many public-housing residents who stayed behind in evacuation zones were preemptively blacked out, left without elevators, heat or hot water. Meanwhile, once again, in a repeat of Hurricane Irene, the city was criticized for shamelessly denying the incarcerated at Rikers Island an adequate evacuation plan.
Now, floodwaters have ravaged the Lower East Side--a historical bastion of immigant social movements and a dense community of low-income people of color, mostly of Latino and Asian descent. Hundreds have taken shelter at a local school, community service organizations are struggling to stabilize neighborhoods, and some Chinatown activists have reported ugly run-ins with the police during their relief efforts.
Endemic social tensions may intensify as households and communities across lower Manhattan and the outer boroughs face both a transportation shutdown and large-scale displacement: public schools closed, battered storefronts practically abandoned. Many struggling residents will be depending on emergency food rations. In outlying areas such as Far Rockaway, seniors and people with disabilities are especially endangered by power outages combined with physical isolation. In old neighborhoods such as the historic Coney Island district, workers and local small businesses are further hobbled by a lack of insurance.
Now commuter routes are gradually coming back online, but not fast enough to meet the needs of those New Yorkers who can least afford to miss a day of work. The Transportation Equity Atlas of the Pratt Center for Community Development clearly maps out just how long and contorted commutes can be for the poor and people of color:
Three-quarters of a million New Yorkers travel more than one hour each way to work, and two-thirds of them earn less than $35,000 a year. By contrast, just 6 percent of these extreme commuters earn more than $75,000 a year. Black New Yorkers have the longest commute times, 25 percent longer than white commuters; Hispanic commuters have rides 12 percent longer.
In addition, as the Pratt Center's director of policy, Joan Byron, told Working In These Times via email, the economic impact of the transit shutdown will be “more severe on low- and moderate-income workers, who have fewer options for taking time off or flexing their workplace and schedules.” Some might lose income because their workplaces are closed, and others could face the burden of “having to find childcare if your workplace is open but your kids' school is closed.”
Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism notes that across the five boroughs, which span an “income disparity as high as China,” the hardest-hit workers belong to the forgotten ranks of “the janitors, the cooks and delivery men, the people who run newsstands and dry cleaners and cobblers and food carts” and the health care workers who respond to day-to-day emergencies. The mostneglected survivors will presumably be those who lack insurance, those living paycheck to paycheck, those without the legal know-how and social supports needed to navigate systems of disaster relief.
Sandy's uneven impact isn't isolated to the United States; in Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, the destruction was especially acute in areas with deeper poverty and weaker infrastructure. Globally, the disaster highlights the irony that the poorest typically contribute far less to environmental damage than the elite, but face the worst environmental burdens (though they also manage in some places to respond and resist through innovative grassroots environmental initiatives).
But even within supposedly prosperous U.S. cities, natural disasters compound manufactured inequality. The aid effort following another disaster in New York, the September 11 attacks, was undermined by the government's profound disconnect from the poor. A report by the Urban Justice Center found that after 9/11 hit local communities with huge job losses, “the main problem with disaster aid was not that too many individuals and families sought aid; to the contrary, despite potential eligibility, many economic victims we interviewed did not seek and were not receiving disaster aid at all.” In other words, entrenched economic and bureaucratic barriers ushered in a second wave of trauma for immigrants and the poor. 
There's one potential ray of light in the aftermath of Sandy: a wake-up call for a massive public investments to beef up the city’s defenses against climate change. A strong transit system is integral to an environmentally sustainable urban grid. And a targeted overhaul of New York’s creaky bus and subway lines could deliver equity to low-income neighborhoods in two ways: greater access to good jobs in other areas, and investment in decent local transit and construction jobs that help make neighborhoods more economically and ecologically resilient. Veronica Vanterpool of the Tri-State Transportation Campaign, which advocates for equitable regional transit policies, tells In These Times that transit is sometimes glossed over in the debates about creating so-called green jobs in both building and operating mass transit systems. In fact, she said, "transit equity does encompass... increased opportunity to these [job] fields that traditionally have not been marketed to these marginalized communities."
In the immediate aftermath, however, recovery work--from restoring electricity to rebuilding homes--will be grueling, hazardous and handled by unions that often come under political and economic siege. As Jamilah King points out at Colorlines.com, workers in the city’s transit union, long a bulwark of black and Latino labor (and of militant public-sector organizing) will lead the repair of a city whose politicians have been steadily eroding their working conditions and benefits.
New York will survive Sandy, but so will the city's persistent inequalities and environmental precarity. So when the electricity comes back on, working people should understand that before the next crisis hits, they need to leverage the devastation to generate new political and economic power.

Monday, October 22, 2012

NOTES FROM A NATIVE SON


 IF CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE, THEY SHOULD ALSO BE LIABLE AS PEOPLE.
Statement From Ben Ikari

ACCORDING TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (2010), CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE. I AGREE TO THIS PROPOSITION OR CONCEPT. THE COURT IS RIGHT. PEOPLE THINK THROUGH, PLAN AND ESTABLISH, RUN CORPORATIONS. THEREFORE, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE WHEN LOOKING FROM A SIMPLE CREATIVE, BUSINESS AND LEGAL STANDPOINT. WE ALSO KNOW OBVIOUSLY THAT,  CORPORATIONS ARE SIMPLY INANIMATE; LEGAL ENTITIES; THEY DON'T THINK OR SPEAK. CORPORATIONS DON'T WALK, EAT NOR ESTABLISH AND RUN THEMSELVES. THEY AREN'T PEOPLE FROM A LIVING THING OR BEING THAT BREATHES STANDPOINT-VAGUE NAME THEY HAVE.

GIVEN THE SUPREME COURT'S PROPOSITION AND BUSINESS THINKING, HOWEVER,  IT'S TIME THE OWNERS, SHAREHOLDERS, PRESIDENTS AND DIRECTORS OF CORPORATIONS COME TO TERMS WITH THEIR OWN REALITY AND ACCEPT CORPORATE LIABILITY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY  WHEN IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THEY ARE LIABLE WHEN IN VIOLATION OF DOMESTIC/NATIONAL  LAWS, WHICH MOSTLY AGREE WITH AND INCORPORATE THE FORMER. THESE OWNERS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BIG-WINGS SHOULD OWN UP THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES BECAUSE CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE AS CERTIFIED BY LAW-THE SUPREME COURT.

CORPORATIONS SHOULD NOT ONLY BE ALLOWED THE FREE PASS TO BE PEOPLE TO SPEND MONEY RECKLESSLY AND BUY ELECTIONS,THUS DESTROYING THE ELECTORAL CUM POLITICAL FABRIC OR FRAMEWORK OF AMERICA, ETC. AND FORCING LEADERSHIP AND DEMOCRACY FROM THE GRASSROOTS TO BECOME  MONEY CONTEST. THEY SHOULD AS WELL AND EXPEDITIOUSLY BE PEOPLE ACROSS THE BOARD WITH THE AIM OR OBJECTIVE OF DOING RIGHT BY EVERY PEOPLE: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES AND ETHNIC NATIONALITIES OR GROUPS; ORGANIZATIONS AND NATION-STATES, AND NOT JUST THEMSELVES ALONE.

MEANING, IF CORPORATIONS ARE THE PEOPLE WHICH THEY ARE, HAVE FREE PASS TO DO BUSINESS EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD BECAUSE THEY ARE PEOPLE, THEY ALSO SHOULD BE WILLING AND ABLE (OR MAKE TO, OR AS WITH THEIR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) MANIFESTOS THAT SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS) TO DO RIGHT BY ALL PEOPLES. THIS IS  IRRESPECTIVE OF COLOR AND LANGUAGE, NATIONALITY, GROUP, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION OR SEX AMONG OTHER VARIATIONS. DOING  THE CONTRARY MEANS  DISCRIMINATION (CORPORATE), WHICH AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PROHIBIT, THOUGH THEY EXIST.

 ON A MORE SERIOUS NOTE, THE PIRATES OF YESTER-YEARS (AS WITH LEADERS OF MILITIA OR REBEL GROUPS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR REGULAR INDIVIDUALS) WHICH  THE FIRST U.S. CONGRESS ENVISAGED IN ITS 1789 ALIEN TORT STATUTE (ATS) OGONIS HAVE USED IN THE KIOBEL ET AL CASE TO TRY TO BRING THEIR TORMENTOR  TO JUSTICE, ARE THE $HELLS OF TODAY! $HELL OIL, AS PIRATES' INCORPORATED; HOW ABOUT THAT? IT'S CONSISTENT OR COMPATIBLE INDEED!

LIKE THE MANY $HELL'S ARGUMENTS/BRIEFS I HAVE READ IN THIS CASE, IT'S BIZARRE, DESPICABLE WHEN I SAT AT THE SUPREME COURT MONDAY, OCT. 1 AND HEARD $HELL'S LAWYER KATHLEEN SULLIVAN AND THE OBAMA SOLICITOR-GENERAL, DONALD VERRILLI JR. ASKING THE JUSTICES TO NOT ALLOW THESE EGREGIOUS CRIMES TRIED IN USA.

SULLIVAN'S CORE REASONS: THE ATS DIDN'T INTEND TO CORRECT OR PUNISH CORPORATIONS BUT INDIVIDUALS,AS THOUGH CORPORATIONS ESTABLISH AND RUN THEMSELVES.  WHEN SHE IS PAID FOR HER LEGAL SERVICES A ROBOT KNOWN AS CORPORATION DO NOT PAY HER. HUMAN BEINGS/PEOPLE DISCUSS, NEGOTIATE WITH HER OR HER REPRESENTATIVE (S) AND PROCESS HER PAYMENT. SO WHILE SOME MAY EXPRESS SYMPATHY FOR THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT FOR ITS NATIONAL OIL INTEREST, OR THE NEED FOR SOME TO THINKER THE RECENT SUBJECT MATTER (EXTRATERRITORIALITY, WHICH THE ATS, AS THE NAME IMPLIES  ALREADY SETTLED) IN THE KIOBEL V. $HELL CASE. THIS CASE BOILS DOWN TO THE 2010 SUPREME COURT RULING, THAT CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE, AS CITED ABOVE. THIS IS A CONCEPT GOV.  MITT ROMNEY BOUGHT AND, AGAIN,  I AGREE BECAUSE CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE.

NOTE THAT SULLIVAN ALSO REASONED THAT CORPORATIONS AREN'T LIABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THAT THE CRIMES $HELL IS DEFENDING WERE NOT COMMITTED IN USA SO HER CLIENT SHOULD BE LET LOOSE TO COMMIT FURTHER CRIMES DESPITE THE CHECKS AND BALANCES PUT IN PLACE BY THE ATS. IT IS TRUE THAT THE ATS DID NOT SAY EXPRESSLY THAT CORPORATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO ITS PROVISIONS/JURISDICTION. IT ALSO DID NOT SAY THEY ARE NOT. SO SULLIVAN'S/$HELL'S ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT, ESPECIALLY WHERE CRIMES PROHIBITED BY THE LAW OF NATIONS,WHICH THE ATS SUBSCRIBES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED. THERE IS NO SERIOUS SOCIETY THAT WILL GRANT EXPRESS PASSPORT TO CORPORATIONS (OR ANY GROUP/PERSONS) TO KILL BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT MENTIONED DIRECTLY IN THE LAWS SET FORTH AGAINST KILLING AND RELATED OFFENSES/CRIMES.

 AS WITH PIRATES, IF CORPORATIONS CAN BE LIABLE UNDER DOMESTIC OR NATIONAL LAW,THEN NOTHING BARS THEM FROM BEING LIABLE WHEN THEY COMMIT OR AID AND ABET THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS SUCH AS TORTURE, EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING, OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE $HELL IS CHARGED WITH,THUS  DEFENDING. IN ADDITION, $HELL OWNERS AND SOME OTHER OWNERS OF CORPORATIONS OR MANAGEMENT HAVE PIRATES' ATTITUDES AND THESE ATTITUDES ARE OBVIOUS AS CAN BE SEEN IN THE MANNER OGONIS (NIGER DELTANS) AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT ARE TREATED BY $HELL, EXXON MOBILE AND OTHER WESTERN CORPORATIONS IN NIGERIA.

  MEANWHILE, THE OBAMA GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENT THROUGH ITS SOLICITOR-GENERAL WAS THAT AMERICA SHALL SUFFER ADVERSE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FROM NIGERIA, OTHER NATIONS. THIS IS, OF COURSE, AN UNFOUNDED PROPOSITION, AS NO SUCH EVIDENCE EXIST AFTER SOSA V. ALVAREZ MACHAIN DECISION IN 2004, ETC. ALSO, USA WILL REMAIN A BIG AID GIVER TO NIGERIA DESPITE THE OIL RESERVES THE ILLEGAL/BRITISH-FRAUDULENTLY CREATED COUNTRY STOLE FROM NIGER DELTANS, CAUSING CORRUPTION, UNTOLD HARDSHIP,ENVIRONMENT RUINATION AND DEATH TO THE PEOPLE.

 IT IS THIS SAME ATS THE CHIEF ABIOLA FAMILY AND OTHERS OF NIGERIA USED TO DRAG FORMER HEAD OF STATE ABDUSALAMI ABUBAKAR TO USA COURT, AND IT SETTLED OUT OF COURT UNDER FORMER PRESIDENT OLUSEGUN OBASANJO, I BELIEVE. $HELL ALSO SETTLED THE WIWA ET AL V. $HELL IN 2009 UNDER THIS LAW OR JURISDICTION. THERE ARE FRESH PRECEDENT TO THE APPLICATION OF THE ATS,WHEREAS THE OBAMA LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD NOT POINT TO ONE PRECEDENT JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT FEAR. THE ONLY ISSUE HERE THEREFORE, IS CORPORATE FEAR (HENCE PRESSURE) FOR LIABILITIES THAT MAY ARISE DUE TO SUSPECTED OR POSSIBLE DECADES OF CRIMINAL/DEADLY ACTIVITIES FOR PROFIT-MAKING ABROAD.

 NO ADVERSE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES NOR STRAINED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NIGERIA HAS ENSUED NOR WOULD ENSUE CONTRARY TO USA GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENT, WHICH THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL CLAIMED WAS "PERSUASIVE" WHEN ASKED HIS COMPELLING REASONS, INSTEAD OF REFERRING TO ANY CASE-LAW TO THIS EFFECT. IN SHORT, THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA DID NOT AND  IS NOT PUTTING FORWARD ANY SOVEREIGNTY OR EXTRATERRITORIAL ARGUMENT IN THIS CASE, BECAUSE IT'S NON SEQUITUR CONSIDERING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROVISIONS OF ATS.

UNFORTUNATELY, OBAMA GOVERNMENT WILL  FEEL COMFORTABLE IF THIS ROGUE, TERRORIST AND DEADLY $HELL AND ITS LIKES/USA CORPS,WHICH HAVE COMMITTED OR MAY COMMIT SIMILAR CRIMES IN AFRICA FOR PROFIT AND AMERICAN BENEFIT ARE SET FREE. LIKE $HELL,THIS GOVERNMENT WILL FEEL SATISFIED IF THESE EXPLOITATIVE AND OPPRESSIVE CORPORATIONS COMMIT TORTURE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMAN AND GENOCIDE/CORPSNOCIDE IN AFRICA AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ALLOWED UNCHECKED.

IRONICALLY, USA HAS HUMAN RIGHTS AS ONE OF ITS MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICIES. IT IS  DISAPPOINTING THAT OBAMA/HIS ADMINISTRATION,WHICH SUPPORTED OUR CASE IN FEBRUARY WHEN WE FIRST APPEARED BEFORE THE COURT SEEMS TO HAVE TURNED DUE TO WHAT APPEARS TO BE CORPORATE PRESSURE. MEANWHILE, LET IT BE KNOWN THAT ANY GOVERNMENT/GROUP,WHICH SUPPORT $HELL IN THIS CASE SUPPORTS TORTURE AND GENOCIDE AGAINST OGONI AND OTHER CORPORATELY OPPRESSED GROUPS AROUND THE GLOBE. BY THIS FACT OBAMA AND HIS ADMINISTRATION ARE SUPPORTING THESE CRIMES TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE OPPRESSED, DISADVANTAGED, WEAK AND POOR.

FINALLY, THE ONLY HOPE NOW IS THE SUPREME COURT WHICH IS INDEPENDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH YET DEPENDENT AS JUSTICES ARE DIVIDED ON PARTY/PHILOSOPHICAL, IDEOLOGICAL LINES. THE CONSOLATION THOUGH, IS THE LEGALISTIC PRECEDENT, AND CREDIBILITY (INTEGRITY), MORALITY TEST OF THE COURT- HENCE THE NEED FOR THE  PRESERVATION OF THE STARE DECISIS DOCTRINE. THESE HONORABLE AND RESPECTED JUSTICES HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY, DUTY TO HELP STOP TORTURE AND GENOCIDE BY UPHOLDING HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS, WHICH INCLUDES THEIR OWN LEGAL AND MORAL AUTHORITY AND LEGACY IN SOSA ABOVE.

IF THEY RULE IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS, THE COURT MUST HAVE SENT A SERIOUS SIGNAL/CORRECTIVE MESSAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENTALLY RACIST, POLLUTANT AND KILLER CORPORATION-$HELL AND ITS LIKES. IF TO THE CONTRARY,THEN $HELL AND OTHER SUCH CORPS SHALL BE EMBOLDENED AND GRANTED THE FREE PASSPORT AS PIRATES/KILLERS' INCORPORATED TO KILL FOR PROFIT WITHOUT RECOURSE OR LOOKING BACK. THIS WILL BE A GREAT BLOW, SETBACK TO HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IT WILL BE UNFORTUNATE!


THE AUTHOR OF THIS ARTICLE CAN BE REACHED AT BAMCKARY@HOTMAIL.COM.

Friday, August 24, 2012

NOTES FROM A NATIVE SON

—Eds.

Chemical Catastrophe: From Bhopal to BP Texas City

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Tomás Mac Sheoin (tomas.x [at] ireland.com) is an independent scholar in Ireland who writes on the chemical industry and popular movements. He has writtenAsphyxiating Asia (2003), a book about the chemical industry in Asia.

Twenty-five years ago, a runaway chemical reaction in a tank at a Union Carbide (UC) pesticide factory created a poisonous gas which, unimpeded by the factory’s safety devices, spewed out over the sleeping population of the Indian city of Bhopal. Amnesty International estimated that seven thousand to ten thousand died in the catastrophe’s first three days, and that, by 2004, another fifteen thousand died. Prior to Bhopal, concern over toxic chemicals was confined to long-term or chronic effects on human health and the environment. Bhopal, however, showed that the manufacture, storage, and use of toxic chemicals also posed a major, acute risk to the safety of those working in and living around petrochemical plants and complexes.

Bhopal has become the prototype of chemical catastrophes, against which all others are compared. Themes that constantly reappear in accounts of these catastrophes—corporations denying responsibility and blaming workers and victims; critics highlighting corporate responsibility for decisions resulting in faulty equipment; inadequate maintenance; staff and training cuts; and neglect by state regulators—can all be found in Bhopal.

In addition to its standing as a chemical catastrophe, Bhopal, unique in its devastation and intensity, is an exemplar of industrial disaster. In 1985, the Bhopal plant had a bad history of accidents: there was a major series of equipment failures; inadequate maintenance had been a longstanding complaint at the plant; and workers were often assigned to work for which they were unqualified. Corporate management, although lacking state regulation, was aware of the problems, but instead of increasing investment to make the plant safe, continued to cut costs and minimize investment, reducing worker numbers while increasingly employing unskilled workers. After the catastrophic leak, UC continued to contribute to the disaster by denying that the chemicals leaked were dangerous, refusing to release information on the toxicity of those chemicals, and abandoning at the factory toxic waste that continues to poison the drinking water of nearby communities. UC also tried to escape responsibility for the catastrophe by blaming it first on Sikh terrorists, and then on sabotage by a disgruntled worker.

The cause of the Bhopal catastrophe was rooted in the control by a private corporation of a highly dangerous factory that used toxic chemicals without consideration of public health and safety. The disaster occurred as the result of commissions and omissions on the part of the U.S. multinational and its Indian subsidiary, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), along with omissions, commissions, and failures on the part of the Indian state. UC was following a “harvest strategy” in Bhopal, where the local unit was starved of investment, staffing levels reduced, and maintenance and other costs cut radically in an attempt to harvest as much profit as possible from a market, a production process, and production machinery from which UC had already planned to exit. Workers were untrained; machinery was not maintained; some systems were not working; other systems were turned off to make small savings in electricity costs. The Indian state’s culpability is also incontestable: warnings by workers and their unions were ignored, while inspection of the factory was consistently inadequate.

Racist Explanation

An attempt was made to contain the resultant safety crisis to peripheral countries by claiming that a similar catastrophe could not occur in metropolitan countries, due to their highly trained workers, technological development, and strong “safety culture.” Furthermore, the great loss of life was caused by the inconvenient third world habit of shanty-town building close to industrial premises. Thus, the problem was not the toxic chemicals, nor the multinational corporations, but the ignorant and indolent workers and the stupid local people who did not know enough not to build their shanties in close proximity to hazardous factories. The comforting notion that these disasters occur only in poor countries, with underdeveloped safety cultures and shantytowns pressing up to the gates of dangerous factories, is, of course, an illusion. Hazardous facilities exist in highly built up and densely populated zones throughout the planet, as shown by reports that approximately 66 percent of major industrial incidents occurred in highly populated areas.

The racist explanation that these things can happen in India but cannot happen here evaporated in 1985, when another incident occurred at a UC factory in Institute, West Virginia, that mirrored the Bhopal catastrophe in every way except the body count: a leak of aldicarb oxime sent 135 people in search of hospital treatment.

Both catastrophes were caused by runaway reactions. In both cases the safety systems were overwhelmed; both incidents resulted from multiple equipment failures, some of which were already known; UC failed to inform the West Virginia authorities promptly of the leak; like Bhopal, the Institute plant had a history of accidents and leaks; regulators in both countries assured the surrounding populations that the plants were safe, while trade unionists at both factories considered inspection of the plants to be unsatisfactory; and, most fundamentally, both catastrophes can be traced back to decisions based on capital’s values of profit-taking and cost-cutting.

Today, despite major industry and government programs triggered by Bhopal, chemical catastrophes continue to occur. In October 1989, an explosion in Pasadena, Texas killed twenty-three workers; in July 1990, an explosion in Channelview, Texas killed seventeen workers; in May 1991, an explosion in Sterlington, Louisiana killed eight and injured 140; in June 1991, an explosion in Charleston, South Carolina killed six and injured thirty-three. Along with these headline-grabbing catastrophes, chemical factories continue to suffer smaller incidents, killing only one or two people at a time. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, from 1970 to 1998, 372 people died, 14,356 were injured, and 517,000 were evacuated in eighty-seven large-scale chemical incidents in the United States. A Chemical Safety Board (CSB) study found that, from 1987 to 1996, 2,565 deaths and 22,949 injuries were reported in relation to chemical incidents in the United States, while, from March 2001 to December 2005, 273 deaths and 5,142 injuries were reported. Finally, according to the Federation of State Public Interest Research Groups, U.S. PIRG, from 1990 to 2003, at least 25,188 chemical incidents were reported to the National Resource Center by members of the American Chemistry Council—an average of five incidents a day.

An explanation for the continuing toll of chemical catastrophes in the United States since Bhopal can be found in the political economy of the chemical industry. During the 1980s, a wave of corporate takeovers and mergers in the industry resulted in corporations in chemical, oil, and petrochemical industries cutting costs, while slashing staff numbers. Employment in the U.S. refinery industry between 1982 and 1990 dropped from 155,000 to 115,000, according to the Petroleum Institute, while the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union (OCAW) estimated around 30,000 jobs were lost in the chemical industry. Before coming under attack by corporate raider T. Boone Pickens in the mid-1980s, Phillips Petroleum employed 30,000 workers; when its Pasadena complex exploded in 1989, it employed only 22,000. Commenting on the Phillips explosion, Joseph Misbrener of OCAW said, “Every oil refinery, every petrochemical plant” is a time bomb “ticking away—tragedies waiting to happen. The industry is running these facilities into the ground.” This “coupled with the pervasive use of contract labor throughout the industry ensure that they will blow up regularly.”

The trend to cut employment levels has continued into the 1990s, with the globalization of the chemical industry, including major expansion in Asia. The International Labour Organization estimates that over 1.5 million jobs were lost in the industrial chemicals sector of the chemical industry from 1995 to 1999. This trend continued into the twenty-first century, with employment at twenty chemical companies in the United States declining nearly 40 percent from 2,538,000 in 1991, to 2,179,000 in 2004.

Continuing Toxic Threat

A quarter of a century seems not an unreasonable amount of time for scientific and technical knowledge to accumulate and to help deal with the threat of chemical catastrophes, and for state and other authorities to implement regulatory programs based on this knowledge. Yet twenty-five years later, chemical catastrophes continue to result from many of the same causes that unleashed that night of hell on the inhabitants of Bhopal. These causes stem from common technical, organizational, and managerial problems, many of which are directly related to economic decisions based on the primacy of private profit in the design, operation, and regulation of highly dangerous chemical factories.

Chemical catastrophes are often portrayed as the result of uncontrollable chemical processes such as runaway reactions. They are, more often, the result of uncontrollable business procedures. The causes of these recurrent chemical catastrophes are not hard to find: chemical and petrochemical corporations consistently choose short-term economic advantage over the long-term safety of workers, the community, and the environment.

The available data indicate that chemical catastrophes or major incidents continue to occur, and not just in the United States. An analysis of major incidents stretching from the beginning of the twentieth century to 1992 found that 95 percent of the incidents occurred in the period from 1963 to 1992; 674 incidents from 1963 to 1972; 1,746 incidents from 1973 to 1982; and 3,335 incidents from 1983 to 1992. The number of releases of hazardous substances reported in the United States under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 increased from 4,541 in 1987 to 7,656 in 1994. From 1985 to 1997 in the European Union, such releases also steadily increased, while there was no significant decrease in major industrial accidents in the United States.

Similarly, for Japan, data have not shown a reduction in incidents attributed in part to cost-cutting and restructuring in the Japanese chemical industry. Cost-cutting, restructuring, and de-staffing in response to global competition are consistently cited as causes for safety problems, globally. In India, for example, critics point out that staff reductions are not assessed for risk implications, but only for monetary gain, while outsourcing of maintenance to unskilled workers poses substantial risks.

Increased regulation since Bhopal has not prevented the continued occurrence of toxic chemical incidents. While, thankfully, nothing on the scale of Bhopal has occurred, the continuing litany of mini-Bhopals indicates that, in the chemical factories themselves, not much has changed. Indeed process safety specialists and regulatory authorities point out that incidents resulting from the same underlying causes that resulted in the Bhopal catastrophe continue to recur. I shall briefly illustrate this by looking at two recent catastrophes in the United States.

BP and the Catastrophe in Texas City

On March 23, 2005, fifteen workers were killed and 180 injured in a series of explosions and fires during start-up of an isomerisation (ISOM) unit at the third largest refinery in the United States owned by BP. All the dead were contract workers; all the dead and many of the injured were in and around temporary trailers that had been placed near the ISOM unit to support maintenance and turnaround work on a nearby refinery unit. Outside the plant, 43,000 residents were ordered to remain indoors for several hours, and houses three-quarters of a mile away were damaged.

BP agreed to pay the maximum allowable fine of $21 million to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as part of a settlement for some 300 violations, including eighteen “egregious willful violations,” the biggest penalty ever in OSHA’s history. Other costs to BP included plans to spend $6.8 billion from 2007 to 2010 on upgrading its five U.S. refineries and replacing its corroded Alaska pipeline, with $1 billion to be spent on Texas City over five years. BP also paid over $2 billion to settle lawsuits.

BP blamed the blast on “a series of failures” by staff: “Had the individuals who were operating the facilities and running the facilities followed the written instructions, the explosion would not have happened.” BP’s accident investigation report of May 2005 admitted safety problems but blamed the incident on a series of “surprising and deeply disturbing” mistakes by plant operators and supervisors. BP spokesperson Ronnie Chappell said company investigators “didn’t find evidence of budgetary decisions which were an immediate cause or critical factor in this terrible tragedy.”

Unsurprisingly, a different story was told by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB), the U.S. authority with responsibility for investigating major chemical incidents. In October 2006, the CSB’s preliminary report found that high-level decisions to defer overhauls, cut staff, and rein in costs contributed to the accident. CSB investigator Don Holmstrom said BP executives had been sent documents months, or years, before the incident, reporting that cost-cutting had undermined safety at the refinery. The CSB further reported that BP had cut training staff from around thirty in 1997 to eight in 2004, while continuing to cut fixed costs by about 25 percent from 1998 to 2004—cuts that “adversely impacted maintenance expenditures and infrastructure at the refinery.” CSB chairperson Carolyn Merritt observed that BP displayed “all the symptoms of a failed safety culture”: poor maintenance; inadequate staff training; outdated procedures; malfunctioning equipment; overworked and over-stretched staff without adequate supervision. An independent panel headed by ex-Secretary of State James Baker, and brought in by BP at the CSB’s urging, reported in January 2007 that BP suffered a “corporate blind spot relating to process safety,” saying BP was not “adequately measuring, tracking and managing process safety performance.” The panel accused BP of a failure to learn lessons from a fire in 2001 at its Grangemouth refinery in Scotland, and failing to establish safety as a “core value” at its U.S. refineries.

The final CSB report concluded, “The Texas City disaster was caused by organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels of the BP Corporation.” Problems included inadequate corporate response to safety problems and incidents, ignoring regulations, and a focus on production over safety. At the board and senior management levels “decisions to cut budgets were made at the highest levels…despite safety deficiencies at Texas City.” Thus, in 2004, despite audits confirming underfunding, BP “challenged” Texas City (and other refineries) to cut another 25 percent from their budgets. This meant cuts in training and staffing, deferring maintenance, and ignoring federal requirements. The blowdown drum and safety relief valve at the center of the incident were undersized: federal regulations required a study of the relief system, but BP was unable to produce documents showing this study had actually been performed. “By 2005 the required relief valve study was 13 years overdue,” CSB’s Mark Kaszniak said. For Texas City management, “reporting bad news was not encouraged, incidents were often ineffectively investigated and appropriate corrective action not taken.” BP “strongly disagreed” with the CSB findings but said it would give full and careful consideration to the recommendations CSB made.

Accident Waiting to Happen

Details that came to light during the various investigations showed that Texas City, like Bhopal, was an accident waiting to happen.

The refinery had a bad accident history, the Houston Chronicle reporting at least forty-one deaths since the mid-1970s and the Financial Times reporting twenty-two deaths over thirty years, including three deaths in 2004. The refinery fire chief said that the refinery suffered an average of one fire a week, fifty to eighty a year, over the previous ten years.

The unit where the catastrophe occurred also had a bad accident history: it had suffered eight other vapor releases from the blowdown drum between 1994 and 2004, two while the refinery was in BP’s hands. Six of these resulted in vapor clouds, which the CSB’s chairperson Carolyn Merritt said could have had “catastrophic consequences, but for the absence of an ignition source,” while the other two led to fires. A proposal by BP engineers to upgrade the system in 2002 to a safer technology (involving flaring the releases) was refused on cost grounds.

The hazards involved in the use of trailers in refineries were also well known. Three contractors died in October 1995, when fire from a storage tanks’ explosion at a refinery in Rouserville, Pennsylvania engulfed trailers. On January 21, 1997, at the Tosco Avon refinery in Martinez, California, a release of flammable gases ignited, killing one Tosco worker and injuring eight Tosco and thirty-eight contractor workers. Some of the injured were in or near contractors’ temporary trailers.

Equipment Failures

The BP Texas City explosion occurred “after a catalogue of mechanical failures. Alarms remained silent, level indicators failed to judge the mounting danger and valves jammed.” On the level of machinery, the CSB reported the “faulty condition” of valves, gauges, and instruments:

A transmitter told operations personnel that liquid levels were gradually declining when they were actually rising. At 1.04 pm, 16 minutes before the blast, the level indicator read a height of about 7.9 feet when it was actually 158 feet. The tower was so dirty the personnel did not know the equipment had broken. “Had the tower level sight glass been clean and functional, it could have provided a visual verification of the actual tower level” the CSB said. “It was dirty and unreadable.” In addition the level transmitter was miscalibrated, using a setting from outdated data sheets that probably had not been updated since 1975.

Corporate management was well aware of problems. In late 2004, refinery manager Don Parus commissioned consultants from the Telos Group to survey refinery staff on safety. Workers told Telos about “broken alarms, thinned pipes, chunks of concrete falling, bolts dropping 60 feet and staff being overcome with fumes.” One worker told the consultants, “The history of investment neglect, coupled with the BP culture of lack of leadership accountability from frequent management changes, is setting BP Texas City up for a series of catastrophic events.” Workers also said they had stopped reporting injuries and incidents, due to pressure from management, and one said, “The employee is always at fault—and required to sign [a] statement that he committed an unsafe act.”

BP’s attribution of the incident to worker error was put in context by the final CSB report that said these workers had worked thirty-three, twenty-nine, thirty-seven, and thirty-one consecutive shifts. Several workers had worked twelve-hour days for thirty days in a row, some with two-hour commutes, as well. Such over-extension of workers was not unusual in the refinery. Indeed, such intense working periods are characteristic of turnaround and maintenance when there is a major rush to get capital-intensive plants back into operation.

The Subcontracting Problem

Contracting out services, including maintenance previously done by company employees, began in the 1980s and, by 1990, had become standard in the petrochemical industry. Unions were quick to point out the safety problems that could arise from the growth of subcontracting. These concerns were confirmed by the 1989 catastrophe at Phillips, which led OSHA to commission a study that reported, “the majority of firms…advise their plant managers to avoid responsibilities for training and supervising the contract labor force…in order to avoid whatever legal and financial responsibilities would be incurred if the plant was found to be a co-employee of the contract workers.” Given limited data, the study found contract workers more likely than direct-hire workers to be involved in accidents. Safety problems related to subcontracting have also been reported in Australia, India, Japan, and South Africa.

The advantage to BP in Texas City of hiring contract workers is shown by the example of James Aguiler who, in 2003, at the time of his retirement from BP, earned $24 an hour, and who, returning to BP as a contract worker for Altair Strickland, did the same work at $19 an hour. By 2005, Aguiler was working for Industrial Air at around $15 an hour, doing store work. In April 2005, there were 1,100 BP employees and around 2,200 contract workers working at Texas City. A few of the injured were BP workers; all the dead were contract workers. As were eleven of the seventeen workers who died in the ARCO refinery at Channelview in 1990, while doing a turnaround for contracting company Austin Industrial. Many of those who died in the 1989 Phillips Petroleum chemical catastrophe were also contract workers.

Three factors explain this mortality rate. Contract workers are generally less well trained in safety, do not know plant machinery and processes as well as those who work in the factory all the time, and are normally hired for the most dangerous work, including restarting of large and complex production units. Many chemical catastrophes occur during such restarts after production units have been out of operation.

The industry denies that economic motives alone determine the use of contract workers. According to BP public relations manager Hugh Depland, “BP believes that by using workers who specialize in turnarounds that it is actually an additive for safety and operational efficiency. We certainly wouldn’t trust our extremely expensive and sensitive equipment to workers lacking the expertise to maintain it. That flies in the face of logic.” But capital often operates in ways that fly in the face of logic, exposing itself to possible major costs (from litigation, loss of equipment, and loss or interruption of production) through the paring of operational, maintenance, and staff costs. This PR position may be usefully contrasted with the common sense position given by the representative of the refinery’s unionized workers: “I think the person who works in the plant on a daily basis, who knows its hazards and its safety features, is the safest worker.”

Corporate Responsibility for Texas City

Most of the problems at Texas City can be traced to corporate management decisions to cut costs and minimize investment. The background was two decades of cost-cutting and underinvestment in the oil industry. According to one consultant, “BP’s culture was designed to be the most efficient cost-cutter in the industry…out of that came too many corners cut on maintenance and safety.” Many of the safety problems affecting Texas City were inherited when BP took over the refinery in 1998. Instead of investing to bring it up to safety standards, BP in 1999 ordered a cut in fixed costs. BP spokesperson Ronnie Chappell said these cuts were not a “directive” but a “challenge” to achieve savings, without compromising safety or the refinery’s long-term economic viability. In an interview for an internal BP inquiry, refinery manager Don Parus said that, while requesting further investment, he had shown U.S. Regional Refining Vice President Patrick Gower problem areas, including the condition of piping in the refinery—and had told BP’s head of Global Refining John Manzoni of annual underinvestment in the site, asking visiting senior management for more capital.

Furthermore, BP management had actively opposed state regulations that could have helped prevent the incident. BP lobbied against new rules on highly reactive volatile organic compound (HRVOC) emissions by Texas regulators, which would have forced BP to upgrade the relief system of the ISOM unit to include a flare. BP had an answer for this as well: according to Ronnie Chappell, “Even if the environmental regulations had required the ISOM unit to have a flare, the time between what was the effective date of the regulations (December 23, 2004) and the tragedy—three months—would have made it almost, if not impossible to engineer, permit, obtain materials for and install a flare at the ISOM unit prior to the incident.” So that’s all right then. An internal BP email estimated savings at $150 million.

The CSB was also critical of OSHA for failing to target the refinery for comprehensive planned inspection and for its minimal regulation and inspections of a whole swathe of highly hazardous plants with catastrophic potential. OSHA also failed to provide requested information to the CSB investigation team.

From UC Bhopal to BP Texas City

There are many echoes of Bhopal in Texas City. The causes of both catastrophes can be traced back to decisions about investment and cost-cutting by the corporate parent company. While corporate headquarters was informed of the local safety problems, it continued to cut costs recklessly. In both Bhopal and Texas City, management tried to pin the blame on workers, rather than on corporate decision makers.

In Bhopal, UC’s Warren Anderson flew in and took moral responsibility for the catastrophe. Lord Browne, head of BP, also flew in the day after the catastrophe to accept responsibility for the incident. Yet later, Browne was careful to distinguish between moral responsibility—which he was happy to assume—and legal responsibility or liability, which was another matter entirely. Speaking at the launch of the Baker report, he said, “I have a deep and moral responsibility for this company. In that moral responsibility I always feel that when anything goes wrong, I have let the staff down.” But while accepting moral responsibility Browne was careful to deny the report had any implications for BP’s legal liabilities, noting, “the panel did not believe that the board failed to comply with their legal duties.”1

In Bhopal, when the workers despaired of getting management to act, the union warned the local population, using posters. In Texas City, workers used union connections in Alaska to try and get Chuck Hamel, a noted campaigner for oil workers, to publicize the problems they faced.

Texas City continues to be a threat to worker and public safety, just as the toxic waste left at Bhopal by UC continues to poison the waters of communities close by. Three more workers died in Bhopal between 2005 and 2008, a period in which the 146 other refineries in the United States not run by BP killed nine workers.2 In September 2009, the Financial Times reported that BP still had not brought Texas City up to standard, commenting on similarities with “what the authorities found in investigating the 2005 explosion.”3 In October 2009, OSHA fined BP $87 million for failing to correct hazards in compliance with the 2005 agreement it made to settle charges related to the catastrophe, and for other safety violations. Labor Secretary Hilda Solis said that BP’s failure to comply with the 2005 agreement left the refinery in a condition which “could lead to another catastrophe.”4 BP said it was in full compliance.

From BP Texas City to…

The threat of chemical catastrophe is not confined to the BP Texas City refinery, nor to refineries in general. A survey performed for a union think-tank documented endemic safety deficiencies in the industry, many mirroring those at Texas City. Furthermore, BP, like UC, has a relatively good safety record, as shown by figures published in the Financial Times, which put BP’s record into perspective. In 2006 BP had fewer deaths (at seven) than the generally recognized safety leader in the industry, Exxon Mobil (with ten), and many fewer than Shell (thirty-seven), although many of Shell’s deaths were in Nigeria and Russia, outside the notice of the Western media.5

Table 1. Deaths of employees and contractors, 2003-2006

These hazards are not confined to the oil industry, however, but are common to the chemical, petrochemical, and plastics industries, as well. Consider, for example, an explosion and resulting fire in Institute, West Virginia, at the only U.S. plant to store methyl isocyanate (MIC), a major constituent of the toxic gases that devastated Bhopal. Two workers died and eight responders were injured in this explosion, including two contract workers. Thousands of local residents were advised to stay indoors and the main highway was closed for several hours.

This plant has a history of accidents. On August 19, 1994, an explosion and fire there led to two deaths and a record OSHA fine. In 1996 a leak and fire at the plant forced thousands of residents to shelter indoors. After the 1994 explosion, OSHA officials warned of “more catastrophic failures” if problems at the plant were not resolved, and alleged that Rhône-Poulenc (the French multinational then running the plant) attempted to increase production at the Methomyl-Larvin unit without analyzing the effects of these changes on plant safety.6

The 2009 incident occurred during start-up of the Methomyl unit, which had been out of operation for a long period, and which Bayer was rushing to complete in order to meet a sudden increase in global demand.7 As part of the refit, Bayer introduced a new computer control system but had not properly trained workers to use it. A report for the House Energy and Commerce Committee found that the explosion “came dangerously close” to igniting several tons of MIC stored nearby. The explosion and resulting fire were caused by a runaway reaction. The CSB reported critical safety features had to be overridden to reach the required temperature in the unit that exploded, and cited operator fatigue as a possible contributing cause, noting that workers had worked an average of twenty hours of overtime a week for three months prior to the incident, and repeatedly worked twelve- and sometimes eighteen-hour days, with very few days off.8 Written operating procedures were out of date: ten months before the explosion, Bayer had written that correcting these operating procedure problems was one of its “priority action items,” but this had not been completed. Indeed, Bayer’s 2004 process hazard analysis contained over two dozen “action items” that had not been completed.9

Bayer was attacked for failing to provide information on the incident to the local state emergency responders. Bayer’s CEO admitted that the company tried to limit public access to information in order to avoid pressure to reduce or eliminate MIC use at the plant.10 The congressional committee report accused Bayer of “withholding critical information from local, county and state emergency responders; by restricting the use of information provided to federal investigators; by undermining news outlets and citizen groups concerned about the dangers posed by Bayer’s activities; and by providing inaccurate and misleading information to the public.”11 In August 2009, Bayer announced plans to cut MIC production at the plant by 80 percent as part of a $25 million safety upgrade.12

Twenty-five Years After Bhopal

Twenty-five years after Bhopal, the likelihood of other chemical catastrophes has not dramatically decreased. We can expect these catastrophes to occur as long as corporate priorities—production over safety and profit over everything—continue to be decisive factors in the operation of highly dangerous chemical factories. So far, we have been lucky that nothing on the scale of Bhopal has happened. However, we should remember the comments from the Irish Republican Army, after it failed to kill Margaret Thatcher at Brighton: “You have to be lucky all the time, we only have to be lucky once.”

It is not possible to be lucky all the time.

Notes

For Bhopal, see http:bhopal.net. For UC’s “harvest strategy,” see Business Strategy and the Environment 7: 71-89, 1998. For the PIRG report, see http: uspirg.org/home/reports/report-archives/healthy-communities/healthy-communities/irresponsible-care-the-failure-of-the-chemical-industry-to-protect-the-public-from-chemical-accidents. For the CSB report, see http: csb.gov/newsroom/detail.aspx?nid=205 For the union refinery report, see http://legacy.usw.org/usw/program/content/BeyondTexasCity.php. Tara Jones Corporate killing (London: FAB, 1988) is useful on corporate responsibility for chemical catastrophes.

  1. Financial Times, January 17, 2007, p.19.
  2. Houston Chronicle, February 24, 2008.
  3. Financial Times, September 29, 2009, p.25.
  4. Guardian, October 31, 2009, p. 39.
  5. Financial Times, March 20, 2007, p.19.
  6. Charleston Gazette, August 30, 2008.
  7. Charleston Gazette, April 25, 2009.
  8. Insurance Journal, April 24, 2009.
  9. Charleston Gazette, April 25, 2009.
  10. Chemical and Engineering News, May 11, 2009.
  11. Charleston Gazette, April 21, 2009.
  12. New York Times, August 27, 2009.